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ABSTRACT
The America intelligence community in 1950, unprepared to perform its missions, failed
to provide adequate indications and warning to U.S. national leaders and to the Commander, Far
East Command (FEC), about the North Korean invasion of South Korea and Red Chinese
intervention in the Korean War. Post-World War II policies that reduced the size of the military,
cut systems and training, and reorganized intelligence services are responsible for that failure.
Training deficiencies meant that intelligence soldiers deployed to Korea without required
skills. The military trained analysts to assess enemy capabilities rather than intentions,
contributing to poor predictive analysis. Shortages of analysts, photo interpreters, and linguists
further plagued the intelligence community and degraded intelligence collection and production.
The post-war political climate focused on the Soviet threat. American estimates saw the
Soviet Union as the center of control for other communist states, such as Red China and that
paradigm framed analysis of Chinese intentions.
Assessments by General MacArthur, head of the FEC and Supreme Commander of
United Nations Forces in Korea, of Chinese intentions proved decisive in shaping the course of
the war in the fall of 1950. The Far Eastern Command (FEC) G-2 shared MacArthur’s view that
the Chinese would not intervene and spread that appraisal throughout the FEC intelligence
community. In MacArthur opinion, the Chinese would not attack late in 1950 because the
opportune time to do so had passed; furthermore, he thought since the Red Chinese lacked an Air
Force, they would be annihilated by U.S. airpower. Analysts at all levels underestimated the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and failed to understand Chinese operational art and tactics.
Consequently, they did not recognize the Chinese first phase offensive in North Korea, and
erroneously concluded that the Chinese would withdraw and defend its border.
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The intelligence community's poor readiness and lack of capability to provide indications
and warning resulted in the enemy’s achieving surprise. The first surprise led to the deployment,
and near defeat, of Task Force Smith at Pusan. The second surprise led to the withdrawal and
rout of U.N. forces, which led to a prolonged war of attrition.
.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
"Practical politics consists in ignoring facts."1 - Henry Adams
The events of September 11, 2001 have brought the requirement for strong national
defense into sharp focus. A decade after the United States Army’s rallying cry of "No More
Task Force Smiths" was popularized, and five years after the completion of the U.S. Joint
doctrine on intelligence, America has discovered that its intelligence apparatus, especially its
capabilities in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT), is inadequate. Since September 11,
President George W. Bush has issued new orders to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
conduct a wider and more intense effort to eliminate Osama Bin Laden as leader of the terrorist
organization Al Qaeda.2 Serious questions about whether the intelligence community is up to the
effort have arisen. "The agency is being assigned a monumental task for which it is not fully
equipped or trained,” according to an experienced CIA insider.3 HUMINT sources in the
Muslim world are scarce in general and the CIA Operations Directorate faces significant
statutory restraints on its ability to conduct lethal covert activities. Intelligence-sharing
agreements with other countries will go only so far because, clearly, nations will not share their
most sensitive secrets with the U.S. no matter how much diplomatic or political pressure
Washington brings to bear. Overnight development of language capability and cultural expertise
is not possible. One can be certain that since September 11 the U.S. intelligence community has

The first combat troops that were deployed to the Korean War in June 1950 was the 1st Battalion, 21st
Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Charles Bradford Smith. Plucked from
occupation duty in Japan where training standards were weak to non-existent and equipment was not on a combatready, wartime footing, TF Smith was thrust into combat with advancing North Korean Army forces that nearly
destroyed attempting to block the road to the strategic port city of Pusan while reinforcements were sent to join them
in combat.
In 1991, the end of the Soviet threat triggered a planned draw down of U.S. troops in Europe. General
Sullivan emphasized the Army's historical record of deterioration following its wars to avoid cutting military
strength too severely. Radical declines in strength and readiness had led to debacles such as the near-destruction of
Task Force Smith in 1950. Thus, "No more Task Force Smiths," became a watchword in the Army in 1991.
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begun dramatically retooling its capabilities and exercising its newfound authorities to perform
covert operations, conduct inter-agency missions, share information with foreign governments
and recruit HUMINT sources. The challenge is for our national leaders and the intelligence
community to take a longer view, having learned the hard lessons of being unprepared in Korea,
and now on September 11, and to ensure that the intelligence community remains prepared for
the next conflict, after the U.S. has won the current war against terror. All Americans share
responsibility for the continuing education that is required to ensure that, although citizens may
feel secure inside U.S. borders during a period of relative calm, the government does not reduce
military preparedness to detect enemy capabilities and intentions and to project national power to
defend U.S. interests wherever threats arise.
A peculiar phenomenon in American history is that, following its major wars, U.S.
military warfighting capabilities typically have shrunk dramatically. The reasons for this trend
are many, but a central one has always been the apparent financial benefits of reducing force
levels. "Cashing in on the peace dividend" is a popular refrain in domestic politics. There are,
however, hidden costs in downsizing the military. Degraded military readiness results not only
in heavier casualties, but greater financial burded when the nation calls on neglected forces to
fight.
Following World War II, the U.S. military again underwent national bulimia, shedding
manpower, equipment, and capabilities faster than was prudent. At the same time, inter-service
and civil-military rivalries prompted the complete reorganization of the U.S. national security
structure. The Defense Department was born along with a new service department, the U.S. Air
Force. These changes resulted in economies, but they also weakened the nation's ability to
respond to crisis. The military structured itself as an occupation force in Europe and the Far
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East. The administrative and logistical structures that remained after the drawdown were
postured to sustain these forward-deployed troops. The National Security Act of 1947
reorganized many different intelligence organizations with the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the consolidation of the functions of other organizations, such as
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), inside the newly created agency.
The political climate in post-war America had a profound impact on military readiness.
The perceived threat of Soviet world domination colored the judgment of American political and
military leaders. The political climate of the era shaped the intelligence community’s focal point
for intelligence collection. Justifiable fear of Soviet expansion became the lens used for
analyzing events around the globe.
Military intelligence suffered similar force reductions, compelling it to reallocate finite
resources to priority missions. The reductions were too deep, however, and too many threat
areas went uncovered. By the early 1950s, the intelligence community was unprepared to
provide adequate indications and warning of regional threats to U.S. interests.
The reduction in resources and the turbulence created by downsizing and reorganization
affected the military’s ability to train its intelligence troops adequately. The Army’s post-war
reorganization did not include creation of a separate Military Intelligence branch, a lapse that
weakened efforts to standardize and professionalize its intelligence corps. Training standards
were variable and the selection and training of analysts across all intelligence disciplines was
haphazard.
The ability of the intelligence community to provide adequate imagery support to tactical
and operational commanders during the Korean War was inadequate. The number of aerial
reconnaissance planes, a shortage of trained photo-interpreters, and excessive order-to-delivery
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times for imagery support were among the principal deficiencies. Furthermore, a lack of a true
all-weather imagery capability and technological and political restrictions on conducting photo
reconnaissance inside China further restricted the capability of imagery intelligence to support
commanders.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) efforts, at the national, theater and strategic level, suffered
under the drawdown and reorganization polices of the times. The dissolution of service
cryptological elements and creation of the National Security Agency created a whirlwind of
organizational changes that diluted the ability of theater and national SIGINT units to provide
adequate signals collection and analysis support. Downsizing policies severely affected tactical
SIGINT units, which lacked manpower, possessed outdated, ineffective equipment, and had no
ability to deploy for contingency operations in a timely manner.
Arguably, the intelligence discipline that requires the most time to develop an effective
capability, HUMINT, was unprepared to support commanders adequately with intelligence
collection and interrogation. The military reduction policies of the times and the reorganization
of the intelligence community undoubtedly contributed to the overall lack of capability. The
dissolution of the OSS resulted in virtually no effective HUMINT collection operations inside
North Korea or Manchuria before the onset of hostilities. Theater efforts to develop a HUMINT
capability to fill the gaps created by a lack of national-level clandestine support proved
unfocused, uncoordinated and ineffective. A lack of interrogators who spoke Korean or Chinese
and ineffective policies and procedures for the tagging, transport and exploitation of enemy
prisoners of war hampered interrogation efforts during the early months of the war.
While the ability of the various intelligence disciplines to collect, synthesize and report
intelligence on Korea and China was degraded, the analytical centers that evaluated this
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reporting, and influenced commanders’ decision-making, also revealed shortcomings. General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Far East Command, had a profound personal impact on
the analysis of intelligence at all levels. MacArthur habitually surrounded himself with fawning
staff officers and aides who were inclined to tell the General what he wanted to hear. His
principal staff officer for intelligence, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, was a MacArthur
acolyte and the commander’s opinions about the possibility of Chinese intervention very likely
affected his judgment. MacArthur was disinclined to believe that the Chinese would attack and
consequently his intelligence staff disregarded information that indicated that an attack was
imminent. Intelligence agencies in Washington deferred analytical judgments to the Far Eastern
Command and regurgitated the analysis in their national-level reports. This circular reporting
and analysis loop tended to disseminate erroneous conclusions throughout the intelligence
community and stifle independent thinking. Unfortunately, the ability of the intelligence
community to collect information and synthesize these disparate facts into a coherent all-source
picture of enemy capabilities and intentions was inadequate and incapable of debunking the
analysis of General MacArthur and his staff.
The U.S. intelligence community of 1950 was woefully unprepared to predict the North
Korean invasion that triggered international conflict in Korea. Even with the onset of combat
and the refocus of intelligence assets onto the problem in Korea, the subsequent Chinese
intervention caught the intelligence community off-guard. This study will examine in detail the
reasons behind the failure of intelligence to provide accurate indications and warning of the
North Korean invasion of South Korea and the subsequent intervention of Chinese forces in the
Korean War.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE KOREAN WAR
Shortly after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese surrendered
unconditionally on August 14, 1945. The Soviets, advancing into Manchuria and Korea, could
quickly gain control of the entire Korean peninsula since the Japanese had ceased to be a factor
on the battlefield. American authorities proposed a plan for the disarming of Japanese troops
that would temporarily divide the peninsula in half at the 38th parallel, leaving the Soviets to
occupy Korea north of the line, where American forces stabilized the situation in the south. The
Soviets agreed and quickly moved into cities throughout the north. The U.S. military troops
arrived at Inchon on September 8, 1945 and began controlling the southern half of the peninsula.
The three divisions of the XXIV Corps’, the 7th, the 6th, and the 40th, made up the initial
occupation force. Major General John R. Hodge, the corps commander, was designated the
military governor in Korea.1
The United Nations General Assembly determined in the spring of 1948 that the Korean
people would elect one national assembly for the whole country. South Koreans participated in a
U.N.-supervised election in May that selected members of the Korean National Assembly;
however, the Soviets prohibited elections in the North and did not permit the U.N. Election
Commission to enter North Korea. The South Korean National Assembly ratified the country's
constitution July 17, 1948 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established on August
14, 1948. Dr. Syngman Rhee became the first president of South Korea. The northern half of
Korea held separate elections in the fall of 1948, establishing the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea and inaugurating Kim Il Sung as its new president.2
By the fall of 1948, the temporary demarcation line at the 38th parallel had become a
contested, de-facto international border. Kim Il Sung began a campaign of subversion and
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irregular warfare against South Korea as soon as he consolidated his position as president. Kim
considered a more direct approach when Rhee proved to have a tighter than anticipated grip on
power in South Korea.
The Soviets withdrew their forces by December 25, 1948, leaving behind 3,000 military
advisors to assist North Korea in organizing, equipping and training its military forces. The
North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) was activated February 8, 1948. A veteran cadre of
Korean Chinese Communist Forces based the NKPA on the Red Army model. It consisted
initially of a Border Constabulary composed of former Korean guerrillas, but grew quickly to a
force of 135,000 troops composed of seven infantry divisions, three reserve infantry divisions,
one independent infantry unit, one armored brigade and five Border Constabulary brigades.
Each NKPA infantry division consisted of approximately 11,000 soldiers organized in three
regiments, each with three battalions. A regiment was outfitted with six 120mm mortars, four
76mm howitzers and six 45mm anti-tank guns. Battalions were equipped with nine 82mm
mortars, two 45mm anti-tank guns and nine 14.5mm anti-tank guns, while a division had an
organic artillery regiment with twelve 122mm howitzers, twenty-four 76mm guns, twelve SU-76
self-propelled guns, twelve 45mm anti-tank guns and thirty-six 14.5mm anti-tank rifles. The
NKPA organized with a separate armored brigade, the 105th, consisting of approximately 6,000
soldiers armed with 120 T-34 Soviet main battle tanks. The 105th maintained thirty more T-34s
in reserve. The North Korean Air Force had sixty YAK trainers; forty YAK fighters, seventy
attack bombers and ten reconnaissance planes. The North Korean Navy had sixteen patrol craft
of various types and a few coastwise steamers with light deck guns.
The U.S. Military Government ended its control with the creation of the Republic of
Korea. By June 1949, the 50,000 American occupation troops had completed their withdrawal,
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leaving the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) behind to continue training Korean
security forces. The KMAG numbered approximately 500 American officers and enlisted men
charged with structuring the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) as a lightly armed constabulary
designed to maintain internal order.
The ROKA consisted of approximately 98,000 soldiers, of which only 65,000 were
combat troops. Organized into eight infantry divisions, four of which were deployed along the
38th parallel, it was equipped with U.S. made 60mm and 81mm mortars, 2.36 inch rocket
launchers, 37-mm anti-tank guns, and ninety-one 105mm M3 howitzers. Significantly, the
ROKA had only twenty-seven armored cars and no tanks, medium artillery, heavy mortars or
recoilless rifles. The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) consisted of approximately 1,900
airmen equipped with one group of twelve liaison-type aircraft, ten advanced AT6 trainers and
ten F-51s. The ROKAF had no qualified pilots for the F-51. The Republic of Korea Navy
consisted of 6,100 sailors equipped with one patrol craft, one LST, fifteen mine sweepers, ten
mine layers and miscellaneous small craft.3
While there was a rough parity in naval forces, the quantitative superiority of the NKPA
vis-à-vis the ROKA was obvious. Qualitatively, the difference between the two armies was
perhaps even more significant. The NKPA possessed a strong cadre of combat veterans,
especially among the officers and noncommissioned officers, while the South Korean forces had
little battle experience. A few of the ROKA officers had served as junior officers and
noncommissioned officers in the Japanese Army, but many had no prior military experience at
all. Furthermore, ROKA leaders organized along regional, political and class lines whereas no
such problem existed among their thoroughly indoctrinated northern counterparts.
In 1949, the Chinese communists won the civil war in China. This success emboldened
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Kim Il Sung to make several trips to Moscow and Peking to persuade Josef Stalin and Mao Tse
Tung to support the reunification of Korea by force. Kim and his communist mentors had little
reason to expect that the U.S. would interfere with forcible reunification in any meaningful way.
The last of the U.S. occupation forces in Korea withdrew in 1949 and occupation duties
completely consumed the troops in Japan, leaving them far from being combat-ready. His
military force in place, Kim Il Sung engaged in some intense diplomacy with Mao Tse Tung and
Josef Stalin for their support of an invasion of the ROK. Kim convinced the Soviet dictator that
a North Korean invasion would quickly subdue South Korea before the U.S. could intervene.
The Soviets would provide essential logistical support and technical advisors for the invasion
force.4
If the invasion were successful, the Soviets stood to take advantage of the warm water
ports of Inchon and Pusan. A North Korean success would enhance the communist cause
worldwide. Stalin could disavow any connection with the invasion if Kim’s gamble failed by
explaining that he had intended that Kim use material support and advisors for defensive
purposes. Soviet communists also had an opportunity to test the American’s resolve to contain
Soviet expansion.
The U.S. government appeared to lack interest in Korea when Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, in a January 1950 speech to the Washington press corps, stated that the U.S. defensive
perimeter in the Far East included Japan and the Philippines, but specifically excluded Taiwan
and Korea.5 Acheson’s speech very likely contributed to Stalin and Kim's assessments of the
strategic situation.
The U.S. was not prepared for war in Korea in June 1950. The government had reduced
defense expenditures after World War II because of public sentiment against a large standing
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military establishment and the desire to produce consumer goods. America's strategy for
containing communism depended on the atomic bomb and strategic air power. Expenses in these
areas required significant reductions in the strength of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. The
result of the post-World War II drawdown in military readiness was that few trained units were
available for immediate commitment in Korea when the North Koreans invaded.
The North Korean Army attacked across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 with the
objective of unifying the peninsula under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. The invasion led
President Truman to commit U.S. forces to the defense of South Korea. Simultaneously, the
United Nations Security Council called upon member states to do likewise, authorizing for the
first time the establishment of a U.N. multinational force to repel aggression. Fifty-three
member nations approved the Security Council's recommendations and on July 7, 1950, the U.N.
asked the U.S. to lead the Unified Command to halt the North Korean aggression. Accepting the
responsibility, President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur as commanding
general.6
Initially, the North Korean offensive drove the ill-equipped, unprepared, untrained
defenders into the southeast corner of the peninsula where they were nearly defeated. U.N. and
South Korean forces established a desperate defense of the strategic port city of Pusan. The
perimeter held through tough battles, due in part to reinforcement by American divisions. As a
result, the North Korean advancing forces overextend their capabilities, making possible a
brilliantly-conceived U.N. amphibious assault at Inchon.
General MacArthur perceived that the deeper the North Koreans drove, the more
vulnerable they would become to an amphibious envelopment. Planning for such an operation
began almost at the start of hostilities. MacArthur favored the Yellow Sea port of Inchon,
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halfway up the west coast, as the landing site for the amphibious envelopment. A force landing
there would be just twenty-five miles east of Seoul and it would have only a short distance to
move in order to cut North Korean supply routes. The recapture of Seoul would have a positive
psychological impact for South Koreans and U.N. forces. MacArthur reasoned that a landing at
Inchon, combined with a northward attack by the Eighth Army, would produce decisive results.
The amphibious force would cut off enemy troops retiring before the Eighth Army; forcing their
surrender or a slow and difficult withdrawal through the mountains farther east.
Many military professionals judged the Inchon plan dangerous.7 The Navy considered
the extreme tides in the Yellow Sea, and narrow channel approaches as big risks to amphibious
assault ships. The Marine Corps judged that a landing in a built-up area with the requirement to
scale high sea walls to get ashore as extremely risky. Since MacArthur would be committing his
only reserves when no more reserve units were available in the U.S. for deployment to Korea,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated serious consequences if a strong enemy defense of Inchon
occurred. MacArthur's decision to conduct the amphibious assault at Inchon was remarkably
bold considering the uncertainties and consequences of failure.
Against light resistance, the X Corps landed at Inchon on September 15, 1950, and
steadily pushed inland throughout the next two weeks despite stiffening opposition. The corps
seized Suwon, cleared Kimpo Airfield, crossed the Han River, and fought through Seoul. On
September 29, 1950, MacArthur returned control of Seoul to President Rhee.8
As the supporting effort to the amphibious assault at Inchon, the Eighth Army attacked
out of the Pusan Perimeter on September 16, 1950. General Walker’s forces moved slowly
initially; but the North Korean forces broke on September 23, 1950. The Eighth Army rolled
forward in pursuit, linking with the X Corps on September 26, 1950.9 About 30,000 North
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Korean troops escaped through the eastern mountains above the 38th parallel. Eighth Army
bypassed several thousand North Korean troops in their pursuit. Many of the bypassed enemy
troops hid in the mountains of South Korea to fight as guerrillas. By the end of September, 1950
the NKPA did not operate as an organized force anywhere in South Korea.
Despite the initial U.N. mission of repelling the attack on South Korea and restoring the
Republic of Korea to its status before the North Korean invasion, there was substantial military
reason to carry the war into North Korea.10 Thirty thousand North Korean troops had escaped
above the parallel and an equal number in northern training camps remained a considerable
threat to South Korea. Expanding the scope of the conflict into North Korea had the potential to
achieve the long-standing U.S. and U.N. objective of reunifying Korea. On September 27, 1950,
President Truman authorized MacArthur to attack north of the 38th parallel if no major Chinese
or Soviet forces were in North Korea, and there was no threat of war with Chinese or Soviet
troops.11
Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel and on October 19, 1950, captured the North
Korean capital of Pyongyang. Eighth Army pressed the attack north against light opposition
along the western coast, and captured, on November 1, 1950, Chongdo-do, a village eighteen
miles from the Yalu River.
On the opposite coast X Corps attacked into northeastern Korea with the 1st Marine
Division occupying positions around the Chosin Reservoir, while elements of the Army's 7th
Infantry Division's reached the Yalu River in eastern Korea on November 21, 1950. This
stunning progress indicated all but certain victory for U.N. forces; however, the course of the war
turned dramatically with Red Chinese intervention.12
On October 4, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse Tung ordered Chinese People's Volunteers into
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action in Korea. Chinese intervention would change the war’s strategic nature and the battlefield
conduct of the war. The Chinese managed to achieve almost total surprise because of
intelligence failures, both in Washington and in Korea.
Approximately 130,000 soldiers of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) XIII Army
Group infiltrated across the Yalu River, in the western sector opposite Eighth Army, between
October 13 and 25, 1950. By early November, another 120,000-Chinese soldiers from the CCF
IX Army Group had infiltrated into the eastern sector in Korea, opposite X Corps. The total
CCF intervention consisted of some 380,000 soldiers organized into two army groups of nine
corps-size field armies comprised of thirty infantry divisions. The Chinese surreptitiously
infiltrated the vast majority of this combat power into North Korea and covertly staged it for a
surprise offensive on U.N. forces.13
The Chinese first-phase offensive consisted of two feints, in early November 1950,
against Eighth Army at Unsan and against X Corps at Sudong. The Chinese force withdrew to
hidden positions, out of contact, after the initial probing attacks and prepared for future
operations. This lull in the fighting provided the Far Eastern Command and Washington an
opportunity to assess the situation and evaluate the nature and size of the Chinese threat.
MacArthur concluded in his reports to Washington that the Chinese had not intervened in force,
but their strength in Korea could potentially force a retreat of his troops.14 Far East Command
intelligence organizations misread these first-phase attacks and did not realize that the CCF had
intervened in the war until well after its main attack.
The CCF main attack began on November 25, when the XIII Army Group struck the
Eighth Army, driving it completely out of North Korea and ultimately retaking Seoul on January
4, 1951. On November 27, 1950 the IX Army Group struck X Corps, and by Christmas, 1950, X
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Corps was forced to retreat from North Korea as well.
On December 26, 1950, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of
Eighth Army, replacing Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. Ridgway turned Eighth Army
into a tough, battle-ready force and by March 7, 1951 the Eighth Army re-crossed the Han River,
attacked into Seoul and was across the 38th parallel by the end of March.15
The CCF launched a spring offensive on April 22, 1951 and attacked along a forty-mile
front north of Seoul with over 250,000 men in twenty-seven divisions. By May 20, the CCF,
after some initial gains, had been turned back with terrible losses, in what was the largest battle
of the war. After that success, Washington ordered Eighth Army to maintain its defensive
posture.16
Two years of peace talks began in June 1951 with opposing forces locked in bloody,
inconclusive combat, and stalemate along what would become the new demarcation line between
North and South Korea. On July 27, 1953, representatives for the U.S. and North Korea (also
representing China) finally signed the Military Armistice Agreement.17 Because a permanently
divided Korea was unacceptable to the government of South Korea, it refused to sign the
Military Armistice Agreement. Today, there is still no official peace on the peninsula.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE AFTER WORLD WAR II
"There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the United
States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of Natural Selection; for the more
energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe have emigrated during the last
ten or twelve generations to that great country, and have there succeeded best."1 - Charles
Darwin
Following the successful conclusion of the Second World War, the American people
wanted their soldiers returned home and back to civilian life as quickly as possible and yearned
to enjoy the blessings of peace, but the old isolationism would not be possible in the rapidly
developing bi-polar, cold war world. Fear of Soviet communist worldwide expansion soon
dominated domestic politics as well as foreign affairs and became the chief determinant of postwar defense policy.
The post-World War II political climate, increasingly polarized between the Soviet Union
and the U.S., inevitably channeled the bulk of defense resources toward countering the Soviet
threat in Europe, the traditional U.S. area of interest. Communist threats to U.S. security
appeared everywhere, both at home and abroad, but Western Europe remained the fulcrum
balancing Washington's interest against an apparently monolithic Communist bloc headed by
Moscow. That vision--one that saw Moscow and Peking as a single entity--shaped major policy
decisions, the analysis of world and regional conditions, and hence, the allocation of resources.
The military dramatically shrank in size following the end of World War II. The
drawdown was rapid and the priorities for demobilization of capabilities, units and personnel
resulted from political pressure to cut the size of the force quickly. It was not a controlled,
orderly process of reducing capabilities or balancing requirements based on overall assessments
of regional threats and the likelihood of the need to respond to crisis.
Quick demobilization and an end to the draft in 1947 shrank the Army to 550,000
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soldiers largely focused on occupation duties abroad. Many leaders in and out of the military
believed that real military power for Washington lay in the American atomic monopoly. Thus,
U.S. defense policy counted on the umbrella offered by exclusive use of atomic weapons to
shelter its reconstruction of Europe and other conquered areas. Such a policy ignored the
possibility that regional threats might require a less apocalyptic military response. The Soviets'
explosion of a nuclear device in the summer of 1949 seemingly eliminated the U.S. nuclear
advantage, but this change in the nuclear balance of power did not result in redirecting
significant resources back into conventional military force modernization.
The Army of 1950 certainly did not assign military intelligence a sufficiently high
priority. The reorganization of the Army that year designated fourteen separate services, but
intelligence was not one of them.2 The lack of an intelligence branch or military intelligence
corps resulted a failure to standardize the selection of soldiers for duty in intelligence, set
standards for training and performance of critical tasks, and operate centralized schools that
trained intelligence professionals.
The military did not base its force structure on anticipated mission requirements.
Commanders required tactical intelligence capabilities that did not exist in the force structure.
For example, the Army of 1950 had minimal ability to detect hostile artillery and perform
accurate counter-battery fires because it possessed a single observation battalion equipped with
sound-ranging devices and radar. The Army lacked a single jammer and could not electronically
attack enemy communications. Finally, with the exception of the attaché system and overseas
Counter-Intelligence Corps units, the Army lacked a HUMINT collection ability. The peacetime
military required linguists, signal intelligence personnel, and counterintelligence specialists to
support the national focus on a Moscow-driven, international communist conspiracy. "However,
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there was no similar demand for photo interpreters and order of battle specialists. As a result, the
combat intelligence specialties were allowed to atrophy."3
With specific regard to Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Eric Hammel has argued
that while a lack of experienced analysts contributed to the intelligence failure, the "root of the
problem" was a lack of photoreconnaissance capability.4 Hammel is probably incorrect in that
specific. There were ample indicators of Chinese intentions to attack besides photography.
Photographic evidence could have confirmed those indicators, but it was not essential to
analysis. But Hammel'sgeneral point that military intelligence's analytical capabilities were a
shadow of their older self is valid, especially in view of the large number of indicators of
impending attack that were available at all levels, but went unnoticed or were dismissed outright.
Well into the conflict, Eighth Army Commanding General James Van Fleet would
complain, "Today our intelligence operations in Korea have not yet approached the standards we
reached in the final year of the last war."5 Van Fleet's comments in the Korean War support
Hammel's conclusions almost thirty years later. One must examine the details of specific effects
of the post-war drawdown on individual intelligence disciplines to comprehend their unreadiness
at the start of the Korean War. Describing the readiness level and the intelligence community’s
basic capabilities and limitations will enable a more thorough analysis of the effects readiness
had on the ability to provide indications and warning of impending North Korean and Chinese
attack.
The post-World War II drawdown of the military negatively affected the U.S. Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) community. The affects of downsizing and reorganization, combined

with the priority given to the Soviet target, proved lethal: the intelligence community failed to
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warn of the impending Korean War and the subsequent intervention of the Communist Chinese
Forces.
World War II had identified problems in the control of SIGINT collection assets. During
the war, the Signal Security Agency and theater commanders divided responsibility for SIGINT.
It was impossible to separate the tactical from the strategic aspects of communications
intelligence. September 1945 marked the separation of the Signal Security Agency from the
Signal Corps. The new entity, the Army Security Agency (ASA), under the direct control of the
Army G-2, had command of all Army SIGINT. ASA's mission expanded to include the
communications intelligence (COMINT) and communications security (COMSEC) functions,
formerly the purview of theater commanders.6
The newly formed ASA was "stovepiped." ASA controlled all activities through a
separate chain of command, centralizing control over all Army SIGINT and COMSEC assets.
As a separate entity within the Army, it was almost completely self-sufficient. It conducted its
own operational missions, administered its own personnel system, ran its own school, arranged
for its own supplies, and conducted its own research and development. The agency's cryptologic
activities continued to be indispensable to the nation's security. The post-war draw-down
affected the ASA just as it did the rest of the armed forces, and the organization was realigned to
meet new national priorities.7
Further changes were in store for the SIGINT community. Four years after the Army
reorganized all of its SIGINT under ASA, all three military cryptologic services consolidated in
the new Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), targeted against the Cold War enemies of the
U.S. Before the North Korean attack, at Washington's insistence, AFSA and its partners focused
almost exclusively on Communist China and the Soviet Union. Their justifiable preoccupation
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with the main communist threat prevented them from properly covering secondary targets like
Korea. At the time of the North Korean attack in June 1950, there was only one SIGINT analyst
working on North Korean communications. AFSA had no Korean typewriters, no books on the
Korean language, and no Korean dictionaries.8 The U.S. SIGINT community’s consolidation
and reorganization from proprietary service and theater organizations into one agency resulted in
a SIGINT corps that was neither concerned with, nor capable of, providing adequate support to
the Far Eastern Command. U.S. SIGINT capabilities would require significant buildup before
they were a capable combat-multiplier in the Korean War.
Post-war reorganization degraded strategic, national-level HUMINT collection. In 1945
President Truman dissolved the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The State Department
assumed responsibility for former OSS analytical personnel, with the remainder of the OSS
being consolidated under a new Strategic Services Unit that was organized under the Secretary of
War, rather than the Army G-2.9 Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Central
Intelligence Agency picked up the former OSS mission as the national HUMINT manager just
two years after the dissolution of the WW II spy agency. The impact of this two-year loss of
continuity in HUMINT collection when OSS offices in Asia closed or transferred capabilities to
the State Department was incalculable. There was another crucial difference in the structure of
the CIA because, unlike the OSS, the CIA did not provide direct support to the military services.
Instead, the CIA reported to the fledgling National Security Council (NSC). As a national asset,
the Agency had its own budget and personnel and the mandate to gather and produce intelligence
at its own discretion and at the direction of the President.10 Yet theater commanders required
HUMINT organizations dedicated to answering their priority intelligence requirements and
because CIA intelligence collection focused on national requirements, theater commanders
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created their own network of intelligence agents. This proved to be a haphazard approach to
satisfying HUMINT collection requirements.
Army counterintelligence also underwent a substantial restructuring following the end of
World War II. The Army's two standing organizations, the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
and the Security Intelligence Corps, consolidated in April 1946, under the Army Service Forces'
director of intelligence. These two parallel counterintelligence elements, now merged into one
CIC, formed numbered detachments in support of the nine service commands and the Military
District of Washington. Agents from both organizations now received the same training and
operated under the same regulations because the new corps recruited, trained, and administered
all counterintelligence personnel. Authorizations for counterintelligence detachments resided in
each division in the Army, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, overseas commands, and
the Intelligence Division itself. Local G-2s supervised counterintelligence investigations,
although the Director of Intelligence controlled the most sensitive cases.11
The ever-present specter of communist subversion or espionage, particularly in areas of
nuclear technology, reasonably led the military to retain its counterintelligence functions after
World War II. In addition to investigating subversion or espionage, the Army provided
counterintelligence support to its occupation forces abroad. Although post-war Army strength
had plummeted, the reduction in the Counter Intelligence Corps was modest, "falling from a high
point of 5,000 in World War II to 3,800."12 However, the relatively stable numbers hid a more
serious problem. The rapid demobilization of veterans and the end of the draft led to a decline in
the quality of personnel, particularly those who had education and skills born from wartime
experience. This trend degraded the Army's ability to provide counterintelligence support to the
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Far East Command in the months preceding the Korean War as well as the first months of the
conflict.
The Far East Command received counterintelligence support from the 441st CIC
Detachment, which required augmentation from the 319th Military Intelligence Company to
accomplish its occupation duty mission. The 319th was a Nisei unit, with theater
counterintelligence credentials, that made use of the soldier’s native-language capabilities during
investigations.13 The focus on providing counterintelligence support to the occupation of Japan
left the 441st little, if any, capability for regional contingencies, although the units Japanese
linguists were employed in Korea. Unfortunately, the Japanese linguists were not effective in
Korea. The practice of selecting personnel for intelligence duty based on an Oriental heritage or
a language capability was not a sufficient selection criterion for producing effective intelligence
soldiers.14
Forward thinkers in intelligence realized that improving the quality of support to
commanders meant continuity, cohesion, effective training, and professional development for
intelligence personnel. They envisioned a military intelligence corps as a body of trained
personnel for the various activities of the intelligence service. However, adoption of the military
intelligence corps proposal in the post-war climate of demobilization was not possible. Because
the service reorganization did not create Military Intelligence as its own branch or corps, there
was no central proponent to specify training tasks, the conditions for that training, or the
standards expected.15 As a consequence of this lack of branch unification, training suffered
because each intelligence discipline operated its own separate school. All were in different
locations. The decentralization of training continued for nearly twenty years after Military
Intelligence was created as a separate branch in 1962.
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An excellent example of the affects of the decentralization of intelligence training was
the Cavalry school operated at Fort Riley, Kansas. The school taught a variety of courses such
as photo interpretation, order of battle analysis, interrogation, and officer training designed to
produce qualified G-2s and S-2s. An experienced cadre of veterans with intelligence experience
initially staffed the school; however, instructor turnover was high and the quality of instructors
degraded over time. Although it reflected the intention of the Calvary branch to professionalize
its intelligence training, "the Calvary School was not graduating anywhere the numbers needed
to provide the total force with the trained intelligence professionals that it needed to sustain
combat operations."16 As a result of the lack of central management of intelligence training, the
Korean War saw critical shortages of order-of-battle analysts and photo interpreters and the
overall quality of such personnel reportedly was low, as a result of poor institutional training.
The various disciplines of tactical collection and cryptography shared in signals
intelligence training. The training standards remained stable in the post-war period despite
significant restructuring within the SIGINT community. School locations moved, a fact that
inevitably created confusion. The Army Security Agency conducted cryptologic training,
assuming the mission of the former Signal Intelligence Service school at Vint Hill Farms,
Virginia. The Army briefly moved that operation to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and finally
to Fort Devens, Massachusetts in 1951, where it remained the services' mainstay for cryptologic
training for the next thirty-five years. The Signal Security Agency conducted tactical SIGINT
training at both Camp Crowder, Missouri and at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.17
Proprietary schools operating independently within each discipline handled training in
human intelligence. Counterintelligence training continued at Fort Holabird following the
closure of the Military Intelligence Training Center at Fort Ritchie. Army attachés received

24

training at a Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. The Army failed to systematize
the language training of HUMINT soldiers at the Army Language School at the Presidio in
Monterey California, resulting in only twenty Korean linguists and no Mandarin Chinese
linguists in the entire Army in June 1950.18
Organizational inefficiency, demobilization of personnel and lack of resources severely
affected the quality of trainees at various intelligence schools. A 1951 survey conducted in
Korea revealed "that only 7 percent of Eighth Army soliders holding intelligence positions had
either previous training or prior experience in intelligence."19 This finding, coupled with the
poor job performance of intelligence specialists in Korea, led to the creation of a Far East
Command intelligence school at Camp Drake, Japan. Activated in November 1951, the school
ultimately produced the trained order of battle and photo interpreter specialists needed by Eighth
Army that formal training programs in the U.S. could not supply.20 Unfortunately, the creation
of the new intelligence school came almost eighteen months after the North Koreans invaded
South Korea and one year after the Chinese intervention in the war. Theater and tactical
commanders in Korea thus did not get the benefits of having trained intelligence analysts within
their ranks.
The drawdown and dramatic restructuring of the U.S. military resulted in soldiers and
officers who did not know how to perform their basic duties and responsibilities. Individual
soldiers were not immediately valuable to their organizations because they arrived without
needed skills. In order to compensate for the training deficiencies, units had to provide specific,
retraining to intelligence soldiers, a requirement that demanded scarce wartime resources and
detracted from mission accomplishment while units were engaged in fighting a determined
enemy.
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CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AT THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES JUNE 1950
"They were probably as contented a group of American soldiery as had ever existed.
They were like American youth everywhere. They believed the things their society had taught
them to believe. They were cool, and confident and figured that the world was no sweat. It was
not their fault that no one had told them that the real function of an army is to fight and that a
soldier’s destiny—which few escape—is to suffer, and if need be, to die." 1 - T.R. Fehrenbach
The intelligence community in June, 1950 was in turmoil. Extensive reorganization,
personnel reductions, equipment inadequacies, and disjointed training created a state of general
unreadiness. Given the ever-present Soviet threat, it was a massive oversight for the nation’s
leaders to allow its intelligence forces to sink to such a dismal state of readiness in terms of
doctrine, training, leadership, organization and material. The degradation of readiness created a
situation that sharply undermined the ability of the intelligence community to provide support to
military operations. The shortcomings of various intelligence organizations and disciplines led
to poor tactical and operational outcomes on Korean War battlefields and go far to explain the
failure of intelligence to predict the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the intervention
of the Chinese in the war.
A primary function of intelligence is to warn of developing threats to national security.
As defined by Joint Publication 2-0, "The indications and warning process anticipates hostile
operations and provides sufficient warning to enable U.S. or allied efforts to preempt, counter, or
moderate such actions."2 America's leaders enacted post-war policies that degraded the
intelligence community’s capabilities and imposed limitations, creating a situation wherein
indications and warning were more a matter of happenstance than design. Lack of procedures
and organizational inefficiency were also a problem. Major General Lyman, L. Lemnitzer, while
on the staff of the Secretary of Defense, wrote in a memorandum to Secretary Louis Johnson,
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after the outbreak of the Korean war, that lack of coordination within the Washington
intelligence community was its chief weakness. Lemnitzer recommended the immediate
establishment of an inter-agency procedures to ensure that officials vitally concerned were
personally and promptly informed of noteworthy events, thus preventing a situation, such as had
occurred in Korea, in which, “vital intelligence data pointing to an imminent attack…[was]
buried in a series of routine CIA intelligence reports.”3 The consequences of a lack of
indications and warning at the strategic level was that U.S. leaders did not preempt, counter, or
moderate the North Korean invasion or the massive Chinese intervention in North Korea, both of
which were strategic and operational surprises that nearly defeated U.N. forces.
At the operational level, there was an even bigger deficiency. Joint Publication 2-0
defines operational intelligence as "intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns
and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations."4
General Douglas MacArthur, the operational commander responsible for Korea,
developed and executed the campaign plan to achieve the nation's initial strategic objective:
repelling North Korean aggression in South Korea. Despite the fact that the U.S. wanted to limit
its involvement in the military conflict in Korea, American forces were engaged in heavy ground
combat. Intelligence support to the troops in Korea, therefore, should have been priority number
one for the intelligence community. MacArthur required the support of every national-level
agency in the government, in addition to the resources he commanded, in order to maximize use
of available resources, save human lives, and shorten the war. But Korea was not the top priority
of the intelligence community until U.S. forces nearly suffered defeat at the Pusan perimeter.
The national intelligence community provided support to the Far Eastern Command, in
peace and war, in three major areas: Analysis, Signals Intelligence, and Human Intelligence. The
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Korean War predated the development of national imagery platforms, such as satellites and even
the U-2. Analysis was the single most important area in which the national intelligence
community could support the FEC. National leaders naturally enjoyed greater access to
information concerning Asia than the Commander of the Far Eastern Command did. Every
national agency developed information of potential intelligence value. One of the most
important non-intelligence agencies has always been the U.S. Department of State, a rich source
of political-military information. These information sources played a critical role in developing
a national intelligence estimate based on all-source analysis.
By the onset of the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been in
operation for three years, focusing its operations in the Far East on China. Other Defense
Department agencies operated their own proprietary intelligence analysis organizations; all
designed to feed information to the Army G-2. Eric Hammel concludes in Chosin that the
processes that the U.S. had for collecting information on Korea and synthesizing it into analysis
may have been improperly structured and inefficient. Evidence of the imbalance in resources is
the fact that the Army G-2 section, undermanned in June 1950, quickly grew to over one
thousand personnel after the onset of the Korean conflict.5
The national SIGINT contribution to the overall collection effort on Korea was perhaps
the most effective among the intelligence disciplines once the Korean conflict began. After
failing to detect North Korean preparations to attack South Korea, SIGINT later did provide
indicators of Chinese intervention in Korea, a reversal prompted by a variety of reasons.
The few intercept facilities in the Pacific region focused on higher priority SIGINT
collection requirements, such as Chinese Communist activities and the Philippine Huk rebellion.
Covering other targets would require refocusing collection assets away from these priorities.
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With no specific guidance on collecting against Korea from the Far Eastern Command, AFSA
concentrated on obvious items of importance, primarily the USSR and the PRC. In 1950, AFSA
began an expanded effort against the People's Republic of China that included increased
intercept and cryptanalysis study.6
AFSA's justifiable preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet threat limited the agency's
coverage of secondary requirements like Korea. When North Korea invaded in June 1950, there
was only one analyst at AFSA working North Korean traffic, and he did not have a Korean
typewriter, a Korean dictionary, or Korean language books."7 Consequently, while national
SIGINT collection on the Chinese target fed a steady stream of Beijing-related analysis to U.S.
decision-makers and intelligence agencies, no collection against Korea occurred. The potential
conflict area had not made the national SIGINT priority list. SIGINT did not warn of the
impending North Korean attack because SIGINT collection assets did not focus on Korea. Once
the war began, AFSA was unprepared to provide the necessary technical data on North Korea to
theater SIGINT collection or tactical SIGINT collection assets. This caused these collectors to
begin their operations from scratch with no information from higher headquarters databases to
guide their efforts
Tactical SIGINT units’ responses to the North Korean invasion reflected the intelligence
community's lack of tactical readiness. ASA planned to support the Korean War with a
communications reconnaissance battalion at the Army-level and for each of the three corps in the
theater. The 60th Signal Service Company at Fort Lewis, Washington, the tactical SIGINT unit
with the highest readiness rating in the Army, was to deploy first. Readiness of the 60th proved
relative and when the unit's preparations dragged on, a signal collection unit from ASA Pacific
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deployed to Korea on September 18, 1950 to fill the gap. The 60th Signal Service Company
finally arrived in Korea on October 9.8
The mobilization and deployment of these small units only hinted at the coming efforts
for the SIGINT community. "The Army Security Agency was revitalized by the Korean War.
Previously, most ASA assets had been concentrated at the fixed sites, performing a peacetime,
strategic mission."9 Providing support to tactical operations was a new role for the agency,
requiring the activation of groups, battalions and companies to support tactical commanders.
Unfortunately the units that deployed had no jamming capability and were equipped with
outdated, World War II-era radios, trucks, and cryptologic equipment.10 Clearly, the military had
made little effort to develop units for effective tactical SIGINT collection or jamming.
Recognizing a severe shortage of linguists, ASA scrambled to provide training in Korean and
Chinese. Meanwhile, the Army deployed its only two Korean linguists to Korea to provide
translation for SIGINT forces in Korea.11 The sole Air Force SIGINT unit near Korea was the 1st
Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM) at Johnson Air Force base outside Tokyo. Like its Army
counterparts, it lacked both linguists and cryptanalysis capability.12
Severe shortages of trained military linguists were "acute and persistent" and continually
plagued intelligence units in Korea.13 The military used foreign civilians extensively to fill the
linguist gap. These untrained, unvetted, local civilians posed a security risk to operations in
Korea. The one-year rotation program for soldiers served to nullify efforts to build on the
training that replacement military linguists had received. "The average time to serve in Korea
after graduating from school was 9 1/2 months. This usable portion was further reduced when
[security] clearance procedures were not instituted prior to the assignment of the individual to
Korea."14 Caucasian graduates of the Army Language School generally were not qualified
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linguists; they received training in only basic conversational skills and no instruction in military
terminology. Oriental heritage determined many draftees' assignment to intelligence duty. Full
employment of these soldiers was often not possible because they were neither U.S. citizens nor
masters of English.15
The Korean War saw the birth of Low Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) teams, which
deployed in the summer of 1951, manned primarily by nationalist Chinese recruited in Formosa.
LLVI teams, consisting of typically four to six linguists whose mission is to intercept enemy
radio communications, report enemy activities, locations, and plans, and perform directionfinding against enemy radios. The LLVI teams fielded during the Korean War provided
immediate tactical intelligence and were "widely heralded by maneuver commanders as valuable
assets."16 Unfortunately, these teams did not become operational until long after the Chinese had
intervened in Korea.
In contrast to the complete lack of national SIGINT collection on Korea, there were some
limited, national-level HUMINT collection operations ongoing in China and North Korea despite
the dissolution of OSS and the turbulence created by reorganizing national HUMINT operations
under the umbrella of the CIA. At the end of World War II an Army Captain, John Singlaub,
trained former Korean prisoners from World War II at an outpost in Manchuria and sent them
into North Korea to collect information on the Communist plans and intentions.17 It can be
surmised from the paucity of information on that HUMINT effort that its contributions to
warning of the impending North Korean attack on South Korea or the Chinese intervention were
negligible. The dissolution of the OSS and formation of the CIA may have created a situation in
which those potentially valuable HUMINT assets went without clear collection orders or
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priorities.18 HUMINT reporting also may have gone unnoticed among the distractions created by
organizational restructuring.
The HUMINT effort in Korea suffered from critical shortcomings. The newly formed
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had an extremely limited number of agents inside China or
North Korea at the outset of the conflict. Nationalists on Formosa who were running agents in
China were MacArthur’s biggest source of intelligence on the Chinese, but the nationalists
frequently distorted the information, making it unreliable.19 Before the onset of hostilities, the
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) operated a network of Korean liaison contacts that,
coupled with its close relationship with the ROK, enabled the KMAG to collect information on
North Korean activities. KMAG was a national asset, not subordinate to the Far East Command,
and reported periodically to Washington. "KMAG, not General MacArthur, had the
responsibility of securing intelligence data on Korea.”20
American leaders often perceived the South Korean sources as "shifty, unreliable and
guilty of exaggerating reports"21 and consequently discounted the information they contained
because it did not fit the FEC paradigm. To fill the gap in HUMINT collection, and measure the
suspect KMAG reporting, MacArthur’s G-2 for FEC, Major General Charles A. Willoughby,
established the Korean Liaison Office.
As the U.S. counterattack pushed beyond the Pusan perimeter, U.S. forces experienced
difficulty interrogating prisoners of war due to a lack of theater guidelines and unit standard
operating procedures. On October 28, 1950, the theater switched to strategic interrogation. This
was a significant change to the well-established, standard operating procedures for interrogation.
Under the strategic interrogation plan, prisoners were to be screened by forward deployed
interrogators whose responsibility was to identify those prisoners who likely had placement and
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access to information of operational or strategic value. The prisoners, once identified by the
screening teams, would be sped to the rear area to a centrally managed, strategic debriefing
center in Pusan. Expert interrogators could extract the necessary information from the high
priority prisoners and relay it to the highest intelligence levels in the theater. The changes
occurred at the critical time when the Chinese first-phase offensive was concluding and the
timing of implementing changes to interrogation procedures may have negatively affected the
ability to efficiently exploit enemy prisoners of war and derive important information about
Chinese intentions.
Once the tempo of the U.S. attack stepped up, the number of prisoners multiplied by
thousands- a combination that caused the entire system of handling them to fall apart. Properly
tagged prisoners who arrived at the strategic debriefing center represented only two percent of
the total. This made it nearly impossible for the interrogators in Pusan to determine the
circumstances of capture - an essential ingredient for successful interrogation.22 The information
on properly filled-out capture tags enables interrogators to conduct efficient questioning. Most
Korean War interrogations during the first six months of the conflict were largely ineffective
because the questioner lacked crucial background information on prisoners.
The FEC intelligence staff had trouble processing security clearances expeditiously for
intelligence personnel in Korea. Completion of background investigations, depending on the
level of clearance sought, could take anywhere from six to eighteen months, and sometimes
more, to complete.23 Some intelligence staffs were undermanned due to lack of vetted personnel.
In other units, personnel in jobs requiring access to national-security information had undergone
only shallow background investigations consisting of only a check of local medical and
personnel records – a situation that created the potential for serious security problems. As was
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the case arising from the lack of trained linguists, the affects of the shortages of personnel with
the appropriate security clearance cut across all of the intelligence disciplines and undermined
support to commanders in the field.
Like the other intelligence disciplines, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) lacked resources
after the post-World War II drawdown and reorganization. There was a chronic shortage of
trained photo interpreters, causing units to spend excessive time training new replacements. The
nuances of interpreting imagery during the Korean War challenged neophyte analysts newly
arrived from the U.S.24 Training at the various imagery-interpretation schools in the U.S. did not
adequately prepare the soldiers for Korea. In after-action reports, the Eighth Army G-2 offered
an especially telling comment on the haphazard and poor training of imagery analysts. Although
intelligence school graduates, those assigned to the Eighth Army G-2 often were not fully
qualified to perform their duties because they lacked knowledge of local conditions.25
The demand for imagery during the Korean War was high. Offensive operations
typically required daily shooting of 6000 imagery negatives at 1/5000 scale. Defensive
operations routinely required daily production of 5000 imagery negatives, also at 1/5000 scale.
Intelligence was unable to meet demands for imagery during the conflict.26 To satisfy the need
as best it could, Eighth Army produced 1/7000-scale imagery, which reduced the number of
sorties required by almost half, but significantly degraded the resolution of the photographs. The
principal restriction on achieving the output of negatives required was the lack of collection
equipment in Korea. Night photography was possible only with target illumination, restricting
the capability to collect imagery intelligence at night to the number of flash bombs that a B-26
could carry.27
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Units that required aerial photographs to support planning often did not get the products
they requested on time.28 Typical request-to-delivery times for Army or Air Force imagery was
eight days, often too long to be of any value to the requesting unit because of changes in the
tactical situation.29 Since Army and Air Force imagery collection was so unresponsive, some
units put signal corps photographers in Army airplanes to take aerial pictures of critical areas of
interest, from, because that method of collection proved more responsive than IMINT support
provided by formalized intelligence sources.
Overall, national intelligence support to the Far Eastern Command in fighting the war
was inadequate. Theater intelligence collection and analysis encountered severe problems in
providing operational intelligence support. The same was true for tactical intelligence; ground
commanders simply did not get the support needed to locate, target, and destroy the enemy.
The reasons for the disarray in the intelligence community lay in the post-war budget
cutting that limited research, development and fielding of new intelligence systems and
equipment. The intelligence community struggled to make do with what it had as it reorganized
and trained a new generation of specialists and hoped to pass on skills acquired in World War II.
But in doing so, intelligence never developed an integrated doctrine to build a common training
base that leader development programs could sustain. The result was a repeat of the World War
II experience in which the best that a unit intelligence officer could hope for was a pool of
“gifted amateurs” rather than professional intelligence soldiers. The same held true for static,
fixed-mission intelligence organizations that did not design themselves to deploy and provide
tailored, contingency operations support. They lacked modern materials, and soldiers with the
requisite skills, to produce effective intelligence for the commander.
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Commanders from national to tactical levels felt those deficiencies. The results of this
lack of adequate intelligence support were strategic surprises both when the North Koreans
attacked South Korea and when the Chinese intervened in Korea in massive, overwhelming
numbers. These strategic surprises led to the near tactical defeats of Task Force Smith at Pusan
and elements of the U.S. X Corps at the Chosin reservoir.
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CHAPTER 5: REASON S BEHIND THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
"It is very difficult for a nation to create an army when it has not already a body of
officers and non-commissioned officers to serve as a nucleus, and a system of military
organization."1 -Napoleon
The post-World War II political and military situation that shaped the national military
strategy contributed significantly to the intelligence failures in the Korean War. Each
intelligence discipline and program had different circumstances and problems that contributed to
poor intelligence support during the war. Flawed operational and analytical paradigms directed
the focus of intelligence collection and analysis. This resulted in poor intelligence support to
commanders during the Korean War.
The intelligence community failed to predict the North Korean invasion of South Korea
and the subsequent Chinese intervention in the Korean War. These two strategic and operational
surprises occurred because the intelligence community provided neither adequate indications or
warning of the impending North Korean invasion, nor of the Chinese intervention. U.S.
intelligence failed in Korea, in part, because “the U.S. had written Korea out of its national
defense plans, and as a result indications from Korea received less attention than those from
areas considered more vital to American interests."2 U.S. national leaders excluded Korea from
critical intelligence collection because they had decided that Korea was outside the defensive
perimeter of the U.S. Events in Korea hardly factored into the overall analysis of the situation in
the Far East. The elimination of Korea from the national watch list and from national collection
orders was the harbinger of the impending failure to predict a North Korean invasion. The
intelligence community's failure to predict the Chinese intervention represented another
significant breakdown of the national warning system. Analysts did not understand the enemy's
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doctrine, tactics, capabilities, or limitations. Most importantly, they did not understand the
motivations of the Chinese leaders.
These indications and warning failures meant that the intelligence community did not live
up to its obligation to provide warning of impending attack to U.S. military advisors and the
diplomatic mission in Korea. The surprises experienced in the Korean War exposed the
weaknesses in intelligence and in the American military.3 Like the North Korean invasion, the
failure to provide adequate warning of the impending Chinese intervention had profound
consequences for the protection of U.S. forces engaged in combat deep inside North Korea.
One single event, factor or cause is not responsible for the failure of intelligence to
perform its mission. General Matthew B. Ridgeway, Eighth Army Commander and ultimately
Commander, Far Eastern Command, stated that the Far Easter Command General Headquarters
analysis of the indicators of North Korean invasion were “influenced by its conviction that all
these alarums and excursions were just a normal aspect of the psychological cold war.”4 Other
factors combined to create a situation in which systemic lapses occurred. Two of them were
poor training and the turbulence of downsizing and reorganization. The former was not effective
enough to offset the consequences of the latter.
Training given to analysts during the Korean War remained inadequate, which meant that
units in the field had to screen replacements for suitability and enact their own training programs.
The Eighth Army developed one such program to correct obvious deficiencies in the
replacements that arrived in theater, but unfortunately race, national origins, or language
capabilities, rather than aptitude, determined a soldier's assignment to intelligence.
Accurate analysis relies on information from many sources, generally the direct result of
intelligence collection operations. Intercepting and direction finding of enemy communications,
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imagery, and human intelligence are the principle means used to collect such information. Each
of these intelligence disciplines is subject to peculiar limitations, and each may only present a
fraction of the total picture. For that reason, analysts must base threat assessments on a
consideration of all sources of information and not data from only a single source.
The cornerstone of intelligence effectiveness is predictive analysis. Strategic analysis is
the consideration of global, regional, and specific national trends looking at diverse political,
economic, and social conditions that affect U.S. interests in those countries, regions, or perhaps
globally. The failure to anticipate a North Korean invasion was a strategic intelligence failure.
Operational and tactical forecasts of future enemy courses of action allow the commander to take
appropriate measures to protect the force, develop his own plans, and set in motion actions to
defeat the enemy. In analyzing the potential courses of action that an enemy commander can
adopt, an analyst must assess the enemy's capabilities and limitations. Taken a step further, once
the analyst has identified such capabilities and limitations, he must estimate the enemy
commander's intentions. This has always been an area of considerable debate inside and outside
the intelligence community. A capability to attack does not necessarily mean that an enemy will
attack, but if the enemy has no capacity for offensive operations, the likelihood that he will
attack is limited, no matter how much the enemy commander may wish otherwise. Conversely,
merely listing capabilities does not get to the magic "so what?" often demanded by commanders.
Moreover, capabilities-based assessments assume that intelligence analysts have addressed all of
the enemy’s capabilities. Surprises can be deadly. In the 1950s, intelligence doctrine directed
intelligence analysts to determine potential enemy courses of action by analyzing enemy
capabilities rather than an overall analysis of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. "In 1951,
the field manual on Combat Intelligence cautioned commanders to be certain they base their
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actions, dispositions, and plans upon estimates of enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates
of enemy intentions."5 This analytical framework was one of the reasons why analysts reached
the wrong conclusions regarding the likelihood of Chinese intervention. In 1967, General
Matthew Ridgeway reflected on the Korean War experience with indications and warning. “It is
true that in our assessment of the Korean situation” he wrote, “we gave too much weight to our
own interpretation of the enemy’s intentions and too little to the facts we knew about his
capability.”6 General Omar N. Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shared this
lesson he learned from the JCS misinterpretation of Chinese intentions to intervene in the Korean
War when he counseled “It is the duty and responsibility of military advisors to gauge a potential
enemy’s capabilities rather than his intentions.” 7 The pendulum continues to swing between the
intentions and the capabilities wings of the intelligence community.
When looking at indications and warning intelligence, analysts often must rely on their
own sense of what a reasonable outcome would be. Such an approach is risky because a foreign
leader’s concept of “what is rational, or what risks are acceptable, probably will not be identical
to even what the most experienced U.S. analyst thinks will be the case."8
The intelligence community, in appraising the likelihood of Chinese intervention, fell
victim to some of the pitfalls of analysis, as they apply to indications and warnings. For
example, in October 1950, strategic analysts concluded that Beijing would not enter the war
despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Analysts did so because, “according to the
calculations of U.S. military leaders and intelligence agencies, the disadvantages of participating
in the war appeared to outweigh the advantages. China apparently used a different rationale to
calculate its decision."9 Furthermore, there was a tendency within the American government to
believe “that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a client state and that such an act would
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be a prelude to a world war."10 This outlook is reflected in the March 1949 National Security
Council Memorandum 8/2, approved by President Truman, which stated that the Soviets
intended to dominate all of Korea, and that this would be a threat to U.S. interests in the Far
East.11 This line of analysis was continued in a CIA estimate of September, 1950 which
concluded that the Chinese had the capability to intervene, but they would not do so because the
political decision rested with the Soviet leaders who were not ready to gamble on a general
conflict with the U.S.12 In that same month, a National Security Council report to President
Truman contained the same arguments.13 The U.S. had skewed perceptions of Chinese
intentions although significant indicators were available that the Chinese were diligently building
a massive capability to attack into North Korea from Manchuria. FEC intelligence reports as
early as August, 1950 reflected an estimated 246,000 PLA and 374,000 militia troops were in
Manchuria near the Korean border.14 The intelligence analysis made available to U.S. nationallevel decision-makers overwhelmingly led the national leadership to conclude that the Chinese
would not intervene in Korea unless authorized by the Soviets.
Intelligence analysts also failed to understand the Chinese military operational art, which
caused them to miss the indicators of an imminent attack. They believed that, if the Chinese
entered the conflict, they would launch a Soviet-style offensive. Instead, the Chinese forces
conducted an infiltration, followed by a feint and a tactical withdrawal, which the Americans
misread as a retreat. A greater understanding of Chinese doctrine might have led analysts to
determine that the PRC troops conducted a reconnaissance in force and were attempting to lure
the Americans into a trap.15
Like the erroneous perception of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a Soviet-directed monolith that
made Chinese intervention improbable, preconceived notions all too often determine what an
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intelligence estimate will say - or what the consumer will decide it says. Intelligence analysis
during the Korean War occurred at all levels. Each tactical commander made his own estimate
of the situation, taking into account what he perceived the enemy's composition, disposition,
strength and intentions to be. Intelligence officers at the battalion level and above, assisted by
the greater intelligence community, provided their leaders with information and their own threat
assessments on potential enemy courses of action. An examination of the estimates of the
likelihood of Chinese intervention that each of the G-2s in Korea provided their commanders
will provide additional insight into the challenges that intelligence analysts at all levels faced.
The Far Eastern Command CINC and his G-2, General Charles Willoughby, had a
significant impact on the intelligence analysis of North Korean and Chinese intentions, both
within the theater and at the national level. An examination of MacArthur, his background on
intelligence and his relationship with his G-2, is necessary for an understanding of the
atmosphere in the FEC that contributed to intelligence analysis. The FEC G-2’s relationship with
his commander, and MacArthur's own thoughts about the Chinese, affected Willoughby’s
analysis of the likelihood of Chinese intervention. Willoughby had been MacArthur's G-2 since
1941, was thoroughly loyal to him, and was one of MacArthur’s intimate counselors. 16 The
evidence suggests that Willoughby, after a close association that had lasted nine years, had begun
to think like his commander – or had at least gotten into the habit of telling MacArthur what he
wanted to hear. Jack Chiles, the operations officer for X Corps commander, Major General
Edward M. Almond, an alumnus of the FEC who had observed Willoughby at close hand,
remembered: “ MacArthur did not want the Chinese to enter the war in Korea. Anything
MacArthur wanted, Willoughby produced intelligence for. . . . In this case, Willoughby falsified
intelligence reports…[and] he should have gone to jail.” 17 General Ridgeway’s analysis of
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Willoughby was not quite as harsh as the accusations Chiles’ makes, but Ridgeway was
convinced that, “as for the intervention of the Chinese, MacArthur simply closed his ears to their
threats and apparently ignored or belittled the first strong evidence that they had crossed the Yalu
in force.” 18
MacArthur, for his part, in a number of instances displayed poor military judgment and
disregard for intelligence warnings. He had spent ten years, moreover, surrounding himself with
men that would agree with him. "MacArthur had little knowledge of Chinese Communist forces
or [their] military doctrine. He had a well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this
became the tenet of the Far Eastern Command."19 Many observers considered MacArthur the
military expert on the Far East and many leaders at the national level were deferential to his
opinions on how to conduct affairs in the theater. MacArthur was a national icon who in October
1950 was driving toward what seemed to be certain victory in North Korea.
It is difficult to understate the affect of MacArthur's opinion on military affairs in the Far
East. “General MacArthur’s weakness was his incredible arrogance and vanity, which led him to
surround himself with sycophants, even though some able ones.” 20 With a G-2 that was
"unquestioningly loyal" and a MacArthur acolyte, one can see how the G-2 could have adopted
his commander's outlook on the situation despite evidence to the contrary. Indeed, one must
question if the G-2 and his commander considered the evidence at all, or if they just consulted
their own opinions about the likelihood of Chinese intervention, explaining away contrary
evidence with their own common sense analysis. As an example of this approach, Willoughby,
in a September conversation with the future Eighth Army Chief of Staff, minimized the
likelihood of Chinese intervention, remarking that "if the Chinese were sensible [they] would
keep out of the Korean affair."21 The combined analysis of MacArthur and his G-2 was that "the
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best time for [Chinese] intervention was past . . . and even if the Chinese decided to intervene,
allied air power and firepower would cripple their ability to move or resupply their forces."22
Others in the military and in Washington, D.C. agreed with the FEC position, convinced
that Chinese soldiers, much as Imperial Japanese forces had been perceived to have been before
December 7, 1941, had substandard equipment, suffered under weak leadership, and were
constrained by insufficient supplies. However, the experts failed to see the Chinese forces
clearly, focusing instead on reporting that matched preconceived judgments about the Chinese
military. Unfortunately those judgments were incorrect. Many of the PRC soldiers who
deployed to the Korean border had recent combat experience during the Chinese civil war and
were committed communist revolutionaries. While poorly equipped by Western standards, they
had confident, experienced officers who were veterans of almost twenty years of war.23
The opinion that the Chinese would not intervene because it did not pass the common
sense test of MacArthur, his G-2 and analysts in Washington fit nicely with the intelligence
community's opinion that the Chinese would not attack because the Soviets, being in control of
all communist affairs, would not authorize it. The FEC intelligence collection requirements are a
clear indicator of the G-2’s outlook on China and its relationship to the Soviet Union. From
October 5-14, the FEC G-2 listed "Reinforcement by Soviet Satellite China" as a priority
collection requirement, bouncing it between the number two and number one collection priority,
where it remained throughout the Wake Island conference between MacArthur and President
Harry Truman in mid-October.24 “When MacArthur returned from Wake Island, he had no
inkling of the CCF armies gathering in North Korea.” 25 The belief that the Chinese would not
attack unless authorized by the Soviets drove collection requirements and provided an
explanation of how the information collected that did not fit this threat model could not be true.
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The FEC G-2's reporting offers additional insight into Willoughby's analysis of the
Chinese intentions. An intelligence summary dated October 14, 1950 theorized that the Soviets
would not intervene in Korea because it would be inconvenient and uneconomical, but would
allow the Chinese to send troops if Beijing desired. Willoughby’s staff believed, however, that
recent declarations by Chinese leaders threatening to enter Korea if American forces moved
north of the 38th parallel were "probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail." The document
concluded that the Chinese and Soviets would continue to provide diplomatic and rhetorical
support for the North Koreans, but would not make "further expensive investment in support of a
lost cause."26
The signs of impending Chinese attack began to build significantly in October and
November. COMINT reporting that Chinese armies were deploying to Manchuria prompted the
National Command Authority to query MacArthur about possible Chinese or Soviet Communist
intervention. The massing of armies in Manchuria was not the only indications that COMINT
provided of Chinese preparations to attack. Reports of orders for 30,000 maps of North Korea,
orders for large amounts of medical supplies and the movement of rail transportation to the
border are just a few examples provided by COMINT, beyond the buildup of troops, that
strongly suggested that the Chinese were diligently building a capability and intended to attack.
However, MacArthur's history of disregarding intelligence that did not fit his assessment of the
situation likely drove him to minimize such signals.27
Ignoring COMINT and diplomatic warnings was not the only lapse on the part of the
FEC G-2 and his commander. Because they lacked an understanding of the Chinese operational
art, doctrine and tactics, they failed to recognize the PRC’s first phase offensive in October for
what it was: a probe to determine U.S. composition, disposition and reaction to attack so that the
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Chinese main forces could then attack at a time and place of their own choosing. MacArthur’s
report to the United Nations covering the latter half of October reflected his overall analysis that
the Chinese had not entered the war despite numerous indicators from COMINT, prisoners of
war and battlefield reporting from U.S. units in contact with Chinese forces.28 MacArthur’s
report was not the only place where he discounted the likelihood of Chinese intervention.
Probably the most emphatic opinion he proffered in that regard was during his conference at
Wake Island with President Truman. When the president asked him if the Chinese would send
troops into Korea, MacArthur responded that the optimum time for such intervention had passed
and that U.S. airpower would inflict the “greatest slaughter” if they did so.
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In November, after the Chinese first phase offensive had begun, General Willoughby's
analysis of the CCF divisions that had been identified in the Eighth Army and X Corps zones
was that they were not really divisions, but elements of divisions. Later, in November, when
General Doyle Hickey asked the G-2 how many Chinese troops he estimated were in Korea,
Willoughby opined that each division identified was actually only a battalion of volunteers. And
his explanation for the near-destruction of a regiment of the 8th Calvary by a Chinese night attack
was that the regiment had failed to put out adequate security resulting in a small, violent surprise
attack that overran it, scattering it during the hours of darkness.30 Not only did the FEC G-2
completely fail to see the Chinese first phase offensive for what it was, he used his common
sense analysis to explain away events that had already occurred in his own battlespace that
conflicted with his preconceived notions and published reports. When interviewed after the war,
Willoughby told a reporter that the Chinese crossings of the Yalu in October 1950 had been
“piecemeal” and that MacArthur had ordered a continuation of the attack north to the Yalu in
order to determine the enemy’s “profile.”
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The G-2’s own comments indicate that he simply did
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not grasp the fact that over 200,000 Chinese troops had infiltrated into North Korea and had
conducted probing attacks and reconnaissance in force in order to determine the composition,
disposition and competence of U.S. forces as a prelude to the main attack.
Although the FEC intelligence reports produced in October and November 1950 were full
of data and estimates on the capabilities of the Chinese, the reports never stated any conclusion
that the Chinese would intervene.32 Willoughby could not have been more wrong. The FEC
intelligence estimate on November 6 underestimated Chinese troop strength in Korea by a factor
of ten.33 The Chinese first-phase offensive offered opportunities to make informed judgments of
the Chinese intentions, but American intelligence specialists discounted the information gleaned
from prisoners. Intelligence information available to FEC analysts provided factual data for
inclusion into the overall analysis, yet they discounted the facts because the information did not
support the preconceived conclusions in intelligence estimates of the time.
As MacArthur’s G2, Willoughby “basked in the reflected glory and genius of his
commander.” Willoughby’s analysis strongly influenced the entire FEC intelligence community
and challenging the G2’s opinion was the equivalent of challenging MacArthur. Thus, dissent in
the intelligence community was nonexistent.34 The affects of the FEC G-2's conclusions and the
strength of Willoughby's personality affected the analysis provided by the G-2 of Eighth Army,
Lieutenant Colonel James C. Tarkenton. A lieutenant colonel at thirty-four, Tarkenton was both
junior and young for his position as a G-2. His World War II experience had been as the
intelligence staff officer for a regiment and, unlike Willoughby, he had no high-level intelligence
experience. "Tarkenton performed well in the fighting around Pusan in the summer of 1950.
But despite his ability, the Army G-2 never was able to escape the sway of the FEC G-2."35
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Not surprisingly then, the Eighth Army G-2's opinion of Chinese involvement in Korea
initially mirrored General Willoughby's assessment. In November 1950, Tarkenton stated that
only a few divisions of what were probably Chinese volunteers were in Korea, that they did not
represent organized Chinese intervention, but were there only to defend the border approaches.36
Like General Willoughby and a host of other intelligence professionals, Tarkenton failed
to recognize the Chinese first phase offensive for what it was because he was not familiar with
Chinese operational art, doctrine or tactics. Tarkenton's analysis of Chinese intentions slightly
changed as more reports from prisoner interrogations came in and the Chinese withdrew from
contact at the conclusion of their first phase offensive. He reasoned that "the Chinese wanted to
protect the power plants south of the Yalu River and he expected that they would dig in on a
defensive line to do this."37 Tarkenton’s analysis that the Chinese purpose was to defend the
Yalu river hydroelectric power plants that supplied power to Manchuria industrial plants was a
regurgitation of CIA analysis, circa 20 October, that clearly influenced national-level decision
making as well.38
The FEC assessments also strongly influenced the estimate of Chinese activity and
intentions by X Corps, which failed to recognize the true nature of the Chinese first phase
offensive, concluding, like Eighth Army, that the enemy reconnaissance in force had been a
delaying operation and that the Chinese had withdrawn to assume a defensive posture. While
recognizing the capabilities of Chinese strength beyond the border, "as late as November 24,
1950, X Corps believed that there were only two Chinese divisions to its front and that the
enemy was adopting a defensive posture."39 Strategic intelligence estimates of the day mirrored
the intelligence estimates of the tactical and operational level intelligence staffs of Tarkenton and
Willoughby. The National Intelligence Estimate 2/1 of 24 November stated that China had the
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capability for large-scale offensive operations but that there were no indications such an
offensive was in the offing.40
To make informed decisions about plans a commander must be able to see himself and to
see the enemy. Said another way, he must understand the composition and disposition of his
own forces. He must understand their morale and assess their fighting spirit before he commits
them to combat. Likewise, the commander must have a clear picture of what the enemy forces
are capable of and how they are disposed on the battlefield. Furthermore, he must gauge his
counterpart’s intentions and, particularly at strategic and operational levels, he must be able to
visualize how the actions of his force will affect enemy counterparts and their decision-making
process.
Chinese diplomatic dispatches and documents discovered long after the war reveal that
Mao became "a very active reactor toward America's involvement in the Korean War because of
his concern for the national security of China."41 Mao approved Kim Il Sung's plan to attack
South Korea because he was under the impression that the U.S. would not intervene, a perception
he likely gained from Acheson'sspeech to exclude South Korea from America's defensive
perimeter and from his own experience with the U.S. during the Chinese civil war. The U.S.
surprised Mao by intervening in Korea.
MacArthur and leaders in Washington failed to consider their actions through the eyes of
the Chinese. Instead, MacArthur and other Far East experts concluded, using their own logic,
that Beijing would not intervene in Korea because the best time for the Chinese to attack had
passed, the cost of attacking would be too high and, most importantly, because the Soviet Union
had not authorized it. General Willoughby had demonstrated a history of mirror-imaging in his
Pacific War intelligence estimates when, for example, he wrongly had gauged the intentions of

52

the Commander of the Eighteenth Japanese Imperial Army. Willoughby failed to learn from this
experience and during the Korean War he repeated what was a grave error for an intelligence
officer.42
The intelligence community of 1950 had not considered that the Chinese viewed crossing
the 38th parallel by U.S. forces a security threat to the newly formed government and that China
was reliant on a buffer zone for her national security and North Korea constituted that zone.
Consequently, the warning of intent to intervene that Beijing sent to the west through the Indian
Ambassador was not political posturing, but a real warning of intent to attack if the Americans
crossed the 38th parallel which US intelligence and commanders misread.43
Chinese leaders conducted their own analysis of their enemy commander, MacArthur.
Mao's measure of him was more accurate than MacArthur's estimate of Mao and his
commanding general Lin Piao. Mao also had a clear vision of what MacArthur believed Chinese
strength in Korea to be, indicating that the intelligence assessments of the FEC were known to
the Chinese. According to PRC documents available at the National Security Agency, "Mao was
convinced MacArthur was too arrogant and complacent to make an objective assessment of the
intelligence he received. Mao reportedly thought the PRC could surprise him because he would
miscalculate Beijing's intentions."44 More disturbing is the extremely accurate perception that
Mao had of MacArthur’s estimate of Chinese strength in North Korea. Mao was fully aware that
the FEC G-2 had underestimated Chinese troop strength by a factor of ten. The Chinese
leadership may have come to this conclusion in part because MacArthur issued a communiqué
from Tokyo on November 6 in which he tried to color the setbacks the FEC had suffered as a
result of the Chinese first phase offensive as a victory. The unintended consequence of this
broadcast was that MacArthur’s attempt at information operations likely provided the Chinese
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with critical intelligence because the substance of MacArthur’s message indicated that he was
still ignorant of the extent to which the CCF had infiltrated North Korea.45 Mao counted on this
misperception to enable his forces to achieve surprise and be successful.46
There is evidence that the PRC had conducted a detailed analysis of the intelligence
capabilities of its enemy and had developed operational security measures to counteract them.
Chinese troops avoided detection by aerial observation by moving only at night, camouflaging
by day, and employing extensive deception measures by using code names for their units,
making them appear to be small, token units.47 These preparations paid off handsomely for
them, negating the U.S. IMINT capability and enabling the massive infantry infiltration into
Korea to go undetected. The deception efforts confused U.S. intelligence as to the true nature of
PRC strength during the first phase offensive, buying the Chinese crucial time to regroup and
develop plans for their second phase offensive. Chinese and U.S. intelligence stand in stark
contrast to each other in their ability, and effort, to understand each other’s tactics, techniques
and procedures. Moreover, PRC leaders capitalized on their own strengths and exploited the
weaknesses of their enemy.
The purpose of Beijing’s first phase offensive was to gauge American capabilities – and
the Chinese commander accomplished his mission. Chinese documents captured late in
November 1950 include a pamphlet entitled “Primary Conclusions of Battle Experiences at
Unsan.” that made recommendations for overcoming American strengths and exploiting
weaknesses.48 The measure of the U.S. forces was accurate and timely, indicating that the
Chinese 4th Army Group G-2 had done his homework well and that, in the Chinese army,
intelligence drove the maneuver plan.
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Each of these analyses poses valid arguments. It was not one particular oversight or
blunder that led to the incorrect assessment that the Chinese would not attack, but a compilation
of different mistakes, all adding up to the intelligence community failure. The various
intelligence disciplines each contributed its own mistakes to the mix of analysis. Signal
intelligence played, arguably, the most important role in providing indicators of Chinese
intentions to attack, but it faced its own challenges in 1950. The AFSA emerged only one year
before the onset of the war and reorganized into the National Security Agency during the war. In
addition to the friction of reorganization there was constant conflict between AFSA and the
service cryptologic authorities over the control of intercept facilities. The stresses of war
highlighted these divisions and weaknesses and had a negative affect on SIGINT support to the
war effort.49
SIGINT failed entirely to identify indicators that the North Koreans would attack South
Korea. In the five years before the start of the Korean War, the focus of SIGINT activities in the
Far East had been the Soviet and Communist Chinese problems - a logical emphasis because of
the increasing tensions of the Cold War and the fall of China to the communists. In order to
provide adequate resources for these problems, targets of apparently lesser concern, such as
North Korea, received virtually no attention.
The reasons the SIGINT community was looking the other way when North Korea
attacked is well documented in the collection requirements that the SIGINT community was
operating under at the time. The U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) specified
SIGINT collection requirements in two Monthly Intelligence Requirements lists. During May
1950, Japan and Korea were number 15 on the priority list, and the request for collection against
Korea specified only Soviet activities in North Korea and the relationship between North Korea
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and Communist China. The requirement lists did not address collection against the likelihood
that the North Koreans would invade South Korea despite HUMINT reports from KMAG and
KLO of numerous border skirmishes between South Korean and North Korean troops and North
Korean border incursions that indicated North Korean preparations to attack.50 Indeed, the
reality of the situation was that virtually no collection against the North Korean target occurred
due to limited resources.51
For SIGINT, China was the preeminent target in the Far East. The fledgling AFSA and
ASA expanded their intercept capability vis-à-vis the PRC, deriving their collection from the few
intercept positions in the Pacific that centered on civilian rather than military emitters. In 1946,
ASA ceased collecting on Chinese military targets, which resulted in delayed reconstruction of
these military networks once the agency refocused collection on military communications.
Despite the prioritization of the Chinese target and the dedication of the scant resources available
to servicing these requirements, it "would not be until 1952 that traffic analysts could detect,
from military communications, when PRC units entered and left Korea."52
Analysis of the SIGINT reporting did not occur at AFSA. The intelligence community
saw the agency as a collector and processor of information, not as a producer of finished
intelligence products. AFSA produced raw intercept reports that provided critical indicators of
Chinese capabilities and intentions, but AFSA buried the importance of the reports in the details
and supplied no analysis or commentary to provide context or amplification of the significance
of the reports.53 The lack of single-source analysis made the jobs of the all-source analysts more
difficult. With no analysis or summary reporting to guide their efforts, analysts were forced to
read every single report and attempt to place it into context with the hundreds of other pieces of
traffic they received daily. Although reports were disseminated electronically via cable to
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customers in Washington as well as overseas,54 they were not stored in filterable, electronic
databases. The intelligence analyst had to read, plot, file, and analyze each hard-copy individual
message as it came off a Teletype printer. It was thus inevitable that the intelligence community
overlooked the subtle indicators of Chinese preparations to attack as they built up over a period
of months.
Overall, the national-level SIGINT produced by AFSA was effective because it did detect
the indicators of Chinese preparations to attack and reported them in a timely manner to
consumers in Washington and the Far East. It was the lack of analysis by AFSA that hampered
the overall effectiveness of the SIGINT reporting and potentially caused crucial indicators to go
unnoticed.55 Despite this intelligence-collection success story, analysts either missed or ignored
the indicators of an impending attack, and the result was that intelligence was able to do an
accurate post-mortem on the Chinese invasion using information it already had on hand, but was
unable to predict it.
Tactical SIGINT collection did not contribute to solving the Chinese intervention puzzle.
Ultimately, Low Level Voice Intercept teams “produced more valuable information for ground
commanders that any other source"56 but it was not in operation with its first team until the
summer of 1951, long after the Chinese had intervened and pushed U.N. forces south of the 38th
parallel. The 60th Signal Service Company from Fort Lewis did not arrive in theater until
October 9 and did not contribute materially to the SIGINT effort against the Chinese.
Imagery provided minimal support to indications and warning intelligence during the
Korean War. The U.S. possessed no aircraft or satellite imagery programs, at the national level,
in 1950. The U-2 did not become operational until 1958 and the first satellite based IMINT
platform, the KH-4 did not become operational until 1967. With no ability to look into North
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Korea or China, IMINT played no role in providing early warning of either the North Korean
attack on South Korea in June 1950 nor of the subsequent Chinese intervention. The principal
value of IMINT, after the onset of hostilities, was to assist tactical commanders in their planning
by enhancing their ability to visualize the battlefield, beyond the maps that they possessed. Still,
IMINT in support of tactical commands faced some rather severe limitations in its ability to
provide indications of the impending Chinese intervention. Army IMINT platforms were
restricted from over-flights into China and the IMINT sensors of the time were incapable of
looking into China from North Korea. As a consequence, aerial reconnaissance was unable to
provide the photo verification of Chinese activity inside North Korea that G-2s and commanders
sought. Air Force IMINT platforms did not have the capability to collect at night without the use
of flash bombs, and consequently were largely incapable of collecting against an enemy that
moved along its infiltration routes primarily at night. Finally, ten-day delays in delivery of
IMINT products were excessive, caused primarily by a lack of photo interpreters and the
requirement to deliver hard copy photographs to the customer.57
The Army high command in Korea - from MacArthur to General Walker and General
Almond, the latter two in charge of Eighth Army and X Corps respectively - was concerned
about possible Chinese intervention throughout the fall and early winter of 1950. But although
there was considerable discussion of the subject at the General Staff and at the national levels,
the Far Eastern Command did not specifically commit the aerial reconnaissance assets that it
controlled to detect Chinese movement into or inside North Korea. The Far East Air Force did
not undertake visual reconnaissance missions and its photo reconnaissance missions, flown
during daylight and over areas adjacent to main roads, focused on supporting the attacks on the
Yalu river bridges. General Bradley remarked on the irony that orders from Washington issued
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early on in the war prohibiting MacArthur from violating Chinese or Soviet borders or airspace
prevented the potential confirmation of Chinese buildup and infiltration with aerial
reconnaissance.58 Consequently, the infiltration of the massive numbers of Chinese infantry
went undetected from the air.59
"When aerial reconnaissance failed to find large bodies of Chinese troops in the
northernmost reaches of Korea, that information dovetailed perfectly with the earlier conclusion
that time for Chinese intervention was past,” one analyst aptly has observed. “It did not consider
that the aerial photos might not show small groups of the enemy well camouflaged during
daylight hours." 60 Indeed, lack of specific collection against the Chinese as they massed in
Manchuria and crossed into North Korea represented a significant intelligence gap that, if filled
by photographic evidence, might have altered completely the analysis of Chinese intentions and
allowed American commanders to take specific measures to protect their troops.
Despite opportunities for substantial contributions, HUMINT's role during the early
phases of the Korean War was minimal. Before North Korea struck south, HUMINT was the
only dedicated collection asset looking at the Korean target. HUMINT operations inside Korea
were limited to the Korean Liaison Office (KLO) and the Korean Military Advisory Group
(KMAG), a small contingent of U.S. Army personnel whose mission was to advise and train the
fledgling South Korean Army. General Willoughby, the FEC G-2, recognized that he needed
HUMINT in Korea, which is why he established the KLO. Although it did not conduct covert
operations or operate a network of HUMINT agents, the KLO did debrief Koreans and members
of governments operating in Korea on activities that were of interest to the G-2. Both the
KMAG and the KLO collected information that provided indicators that the North Koreans
would attack South Korea. These reports made their way to the national level, although the FEC
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G-2 was not in the reporting chain of the KMAG, which reported through the State Department
to Washington D.C.! Numerous South Korean officials conveyed warnings to both the KMAG
and to the KLO that the North Koreans were preparing to attack, but the warnings went
unheeded. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was concerned about
the possibility of North Korean invasion and during a trip to Japan he asked the outgoing
commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group, Brigadier General William L. Roberts, if
the Republic of Korea Army could deal with North Korean aggression. Roberts assured him that
the ROK Army was more than capable of meeting any challenge the North Koreans posed.
Since Bradley knew Roberts and believed him to be a “professional soldier of good judgment ,”
he took his word on it.61
U.S. intelligence often discounted information provided by Korean HUMINT sources,
regarding them as unreliable because of the concern that they overstated the threat for their own
benefit. Analysts frequently disregarded information regarding the impending attack of the
North Koreans because they believed that the South Korean sources were reporting
commonplace information regarding border skirmishes and other frequent North Korean
activities along the border rather than interpreting these reports as potential indicators of attack.62
It is possible that the distrust of Korean sources was also a significant factor later in the conflict,
when the Chinese intervention was imminent, causing the Americans to discount HUMINT
information derived from POW interrogations.
Once U.S. forces were on the offensive in Korea, new HUMINT opportunities presented
themselves to the Far Eastern Command: Eighth Army and X Corps had POW interrogators.
The FEC opened a strategic debriefing facility in October 1950 and HUMINT reporting soon
provided specific indicators of the Chinese intervention as the PRC began its first phase
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offensive inside North Korea. Prisoner interrogations as early as October 25 revealed that
Chinese units had crossed into North Korea. Yet, Eighth Army discounted the reports even after
three prisoners passed lie detectors, because it could find no corroborating evidence of Chinese
presence in North Korea. The consensus regarding the reports was that any PRC soldiers were
merely replacements in North Korean units.63 Those two interrogation sources, however, did
give a clear picture of China's capability and intention to intervene. Unfortunately, Tarkenton,
the Eighth Army G-2, followed the lead of the FEC G-2 and largely dismissed these reports. The
G-2s did not believe Chinese enlisted soldiers could possibly know about overall strategy when,
in fact, the CCF fully briefed its men.64 This fact provides further corroboration of the assertion
that U.S. intelligence had a poor grasp of Chinese tactics, techniques and procedures in 1950.
HUMINT suffered from a lack of pre-hostility training and the force lacked the necessary
mix of linguists to accomplish its mission. At the onset of hostilities in Korea, the Army
possessed fewer than twenty Korean linguists, and when the Chinese became involved in the
conflict, the FEC had no Mandarin Chinese linguists.65 The linguist problem continually
plagued wartime units in both HUMINT and SIGINT and it led to significant difficulties in voice
intercept operations as well as POW interrogations and clandestine HUMINT collection.
The factors that played into the intelligence community failure in Korea were numerous.
Succinctly put, U.S. intelligence did not see the Korean War coming because national political
guidance focused it on the strategically significant Sino-Soviet alliance. The post-war
drawdown, coupled with lack of investment in new technology, translated into a paucity of
collection assets for targets like pre-war Korea. Once war had begun, political and command
influence shaped, distorted, and denied intelligence emerging on the Chinese threat until it was
too late.
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In the case of the Korean War, warning intelligence failed U.S. national leaders as well as
tactical commanders because it did not alert them to the North Korean invasion or to the
impending Chinese intervention. "Warning intelligence can and does serve tactical as well as
strategic needs. It is as important to the commander on the ground with troops as it is to the
decision-maker located in a Washington D.C. office with national responsibility."66 Many
indicators were present that could have warned commanders. Why were they missed?
Numerous sources of information indicated that the Chinese were preparing to attack.
SIGINT furnished extremely specific indications of Chinese preparations to attack and their
intent to do so, yet "analysts were too prone to transfer western political-military presuppositions
into the minds of the planners in Beijing."67 Consequently, U.S. commanders missed the
opportunity to craft a campaign plan and a supporting information operations campaign, taking
into account the preparations of the Chinese and their security concerns. U.S. intelligence
overlooked more opportunities to identify the intentions of the Chinese, when G-2s dismissed
interrogation reports of massive Chinese troop presence in North Korea with various assessments
that assumed that the Chinese would not invade. Despite these numerous warnings from
different sources, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue advancing north to destroy the
DPRK armed forces provided there was no threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention.68
Since MacArthur was clearly pre-disposed to disregard the threat of Chinese intervention, the
analysis of information at the tactical and operational level did not contra-indicate continuing the
attack. These FEC intelligence estimates strongly influenced the analysis that was contained in
the national-level intelligence products of the day. Thus, intelligence staffs and their
commanders, at all levels, perpetuated a circular loop of misguided analysis and self-serving
orders.
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The national-level intelligence agencies abrogated their responsibility to conduct their
own assessment of the likelihood of Chinese intervention and deferred final analysis to the
judgment of the Far East Command. "We must infer that either Washington was undecided, or
that its view coincided with that of the Commander in Chief, Far East, since it did not issue
directives to him stating a different estimate. The conclusion, then, is that in the developing
situation of November the views of the Far East Command were decisive on the military course
to be taken in Korea at that time." 69 General J. Lawton Collins, the 1950 Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army, conceded that ninety percent of the intelligence information on Korea, at the
Department of the Army, had came from the Far East Command.70 The evidence strongly
suggests that the intelligence community in Washington delegated, in practice, the responsibility
for evaluating this strategic intelligence to a theater commander supported by tactical commands
in the field. The result was that both the strategic and operational level commands misread
Chinese intentions.
Indeed, MacArthur's assessment that the Chinese were no match for the U.S. and
therefore would not attack formed the analytical model through which information analysis
occurred. "It had become an article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by
MacArthur, that no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being
annihilated. This attitude, considered a 'fact' within the FEC and constantly repeated to the
Washington political and military leaders, resulted in the second strategic blunder - the surprise
Chinese intervention in the war."71
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Disarmament would do it if everybody would disarm but everybody won’t. I’m strong
for preparedness. I think the better equipped we are along military lines the less chance we have
of getting into a war with some other nation.1 -SGT Alvin York
In this country it is found requisite, now and then, to put an admiral to death, in order to
encourage the others to fight.2 Voltaire
The political-military situation and historical background present at the outset of the
Korea War provide the necessary context for understanding the significance of the outcomes of
the war’s campaigns. The causes of the intelligence failures that occurred during the Korean
War are clear when one considers the state of readiness of the U.S. military at the onset of
hostilities in Korea. The capabilities, structure and national focus of the intelligence community
during the period between World War II and the Korean War also affected intelligence readiness
and the quality of support provided during the early phases of the war.
The post-World War II drawdown and U.S. defense policy were not the sole factors that
contributed to intelligence failures in Korea. The state of readiness in doctrine, training,
leadership, organization and materials in general, and specifically the preparedness of military
intelligence, were critical factors in the ability of the intelligence community to predict the North
Korean invasion of South Korea and the subsequent intervention of the Chinese. Indeed, each
intelligence discipline and program had its own set of circumstances and problems that
contributed to poor support to commanders.
Operational and analytical principles directed the focus of intelligence collection and
shaped the analysis of information. Consequently, commanders received degraded support
during the Korean War, as evidenced by the inability to predict the intervention of the Chinese in
the war.
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U.S leaders lacked adequate indications and warning of the impending North Korean
invasion of South Korea, which was a failing of both strategic and operational intelligence. The
immediate effect of this strategic surprise was the emergency deployment of Task Force Smith to
contain the advancing North Koreans. The North Korean Army encircled the ad hoc unit near
the strategic port of Pusan and nearly obliterated it. That initial disaster was not unique;
intelligence support remained problematic throughout the early months of the war. Tactical
commanders failed to receive timely, accurate, relevant analysis and were unable to target the
enemy effectively and attack under the most favorable conditions. Surprise by the enemy at
tactical, operational and strategic levels, due to poor intelligence support, temporarily reversed
the course of the war while Eighth Army and X Corps extended their offensive toward the Yalu
River.
The Chinese intervention surprised General MacArthur and U.S. national leaders, in part
because the intelligence community was unready and did not provide adequate indications and
warning. MacArthur's belief that the Chinese would not intervene, despite reporting to the
contrary, led him to press his attack deep into North Korea, extending his combat forces and
stressing their logistical support. The Chinese attacked in massive numbers, quickly
overwhelming U.N. forces and forcing a retreat south of the 38th parallel. Chinese attacks nearly
destroyed some U.N. elements and all suffered extreme losses in men and equipment.
The anatomy of how the North Korean invasion and the Chinese intervention surprised
the U.S. is an interesting study in the analysis of information and the production of intelligence
estimates. Unprepared for war in Korea in 1950, the intelligence community failed to provide
timely, accurate predictive analysis, in part because politics drove the collection of information.
The combination of poor training, lack of men and equipment, coupled with politically driven
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intelligence collection priorities and analysis of information at the highest levels was the formula
for the operational disaster that resulted from surprise.
The post-World War II draw-down of the U.S. military and the dramatic restructuring
created a condition wherein the military was, by and large, staffed with soldiers and officers who
did not know how to perform their basic duties and responsibilities. Degraded by organizational
inefficiency, the demobilization of personnel and lack of resources that also stemmed from the
drawdown, the quality of soldiers produced by the various intelligence schools was low. The
poor job performance of personnel in Korea led to the creation of a Far East Command
intelligence school at Camp Drake, Japan to train replacements so they could function at a basic
level of proficiency.
National intelligence support to the Far Eastern Command was inadequate. Theater
collection and analysis also proved to have serious shortcomings in providing adequate support
to tactical commanders. In the case of the Korean War, warning intelligence failed U.S. national
leaders and did not provide tactical commanders with the analysis they required to protect the
force. Numerous sources of information provided indicators of the Chinese preparations to
attack; however, analysts used western political-military presuppositions when evaluating the
threat courses of action. Indeed, MacArthur's arrogant assessment that the Chinese were no
match for the U.S. and therefore would not attack formed the framework for information
analysis.
Commanders felt the affects of these deficiencies at national and tactical levels of
command. The results of this lack of adequate intelligence support were strategic surprise both
when the North Koreans attacked South Korea and when the Chinese intervened in Korea in
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massive, overwhelming numbers. The deficiencies led to Task Force Smith’s nearly being
defeated at Pusan and the near-annihilation of elements of X Corps at the Chosin reservoir.
Policy and leadership deficiencies had detrimental affects that directly affected the
readiness of the intelligence community. Objective analysis did not occur and decision-makers
were not aware of critical information and had no system for considering contrary opinions.
Furthermore, the senior leaders of the military did not establish standards of readiness, and
allowed equipment to deteriorate and units to become under strength due to assignment shortages
and personnel policies. Inadequate programs of research, development, and acquisition resulted
in a loss of capability to meet mission and doctrinal requirements. Finally, the senior leaders
tolerated low quality accession and retention standards for personnel at a time when the lack of
resources and ambiguity in threat demanded higher quality standards.3
These post-war drawdown policies directly affected the intelligence community and its
ability to provide support to national leaders and military commanders. The Army did not create
intelligence as its own branch in the post-war reorganization and did not form as a Military
Intelligence Corps. The Army did not base training on established standards, there was no
standardized curriculum and the different branches and intelligence disciplines conducted
training in numerous different locations. Analysis training focused on assessing enemy
capabilities rather than a determination of potential courses of action based on an overall
assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions. The military also failed to train personnel in
analytical techniques or the nuances of the situation in Korea.
Intelligence personnel with operational experience gained in World War II left the service
in large numbers leaving behind an inexperienced force with a critical shortage of experienced
leaders. Troops assigned to intelligence military occupational specialties did not meet the
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minimum standards for service, often assigned by the Army to intelligence due to their
knowledge of a foreign language or their heritage. Soldiers frequently did not have the requisite
security clearances and procedures for processing clearances were cumbersome and not suited to
supporting real world operations. The number of linguists was insufficient to meet operational
demands and the language training that new recruits received was only sufficient to give them a
minimal working knowledge of basic conversational skills; no military vocabulary or specific
military training for linguists.
Lack of funding for research and development of new intelligence systems meant that
tactical forces went to war with World War II-era equipment that was outdated and poorly
maintained. The intelligence community had no national imagery capability and theater IMINT
platforms were limited by sensor effectiveness and operational constraints. Imagery programs
suffered from a severe shortage of photo interpreters. Excessive request-to-delivery times for
photoreconnaissance support resulted in most products providing little to no value added to the
tactical commander.
Redesign of the national security structure created significant turbulence for the
intelligence community. The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA and dismantled the
OSS, leaving critical intelligence gaps in HUMINT collection operations. SIGINT dramatically
altered its support structure by creating the AFSA, which later became the NSA. Constant
reorganization in time of war caused excessive personnel imbalances, expenditure of man-hours
and resources with a corresponding degradation of support. Tactical intelligence units were not
formed, improperly manned, and were not prepared to deploy and support contingency
operations. Tactical forces lacked jamming and low-level voice intercept capability and had
insufficient counter-battery artillery-detection equipment.4

72

U.S. forces and others in the U.N. command failed to predict the Chinese intervention in
the Korean War resulting in surprise Chinese attacks in the Chosin Reservoir area of North
Korea. U.S. forces were unprepared to react and were numerically overmatched, encircled and
nearly destroyed. As a consequence of this intelligence failure the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry
Division was rendered combat ineffective; reduced to just over 50 percent strength in the fighting
that occurred between November 15 and 30, 1950.5 The First Marine Division “[between
October and December 7, 1950] lost 604 killed in action, 114 who later died from wounds, 192
missing, 3,508 wounded in action and frostbite accounted for most of the 7,313 casualties."6 The
near-destruction at the Chosin Reservoir set in motion the U.N. forces’ retreat south of the 38 th
parallel and the onset of positional defense and stalemate in Korea. This unfavorable situation
ultimately led to the political defeat of the U.S. in the Korean War.
The Army of today uses the stunning losses that the U.S. military
suffered in the early days of the Korean War as lessons learned so that new
generations of military leaders will not make the same mistakes. In the early
'90s, an oft-spoken phrase was "No More Task Force Smiths." This watchword
of the day was a direct reference to the ill-equipped, untrained battalion task
force that was thrown into the early days of the Korean war and was
surrounded at Pusan and nearly annihilated; serving as a modern day rallying
cry for better training, equipment and readiness for deployment. Indeed,
current joint doctrine recognizes the need for readiness, requiring that
"intelligence capabilities and skills should be established in peacetime to be
available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines."7 It is
imperative that one heeds the lessons of the Korean War concerning
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intelligence readiness. The damages of strategic or operational surprise are
much more expensive than the costs of maintaining a well-trained,
technologically equipped, intelligence community that is capable, not only of
providing indications and warning, but ready for deployment to provide quality
support to field commanders in time of war.
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